AbstrAct: Firms face many different types of information security risk. Inadvertent disclosure of sensitive business information represents one of the largest classes of recent security breaches. We examine a specific instance of this problem-inadvertent disclosures through peer-to-peer file-sharing networks. We characterize the extent of the security risk for a group of large financial institutions using a direct analysis of leaked documents. We also characterize the threat of loss by examining search patterns in peer-to-peer networks. Our analysis demonstrates both a substantial threat and vulnerability for large financial firms. We find a statistically significant link between leakage and leak sources including the firm employment base and the number of retail accounts. We also find a link between firm visibility and threat activity. Finally, we find that firms with more leaks also experience increased threat.
Understanding security risk in management information systems is an important and rapidly evolving topic [27] . We analyze the information risk posed by file sharing. We show that confidential and potentially damaging documents have made their way onto these networks. We also show that attackers actively search P2P networks hoping to find information that they can exploit. First, we describe the P2P security issues, establishing the vulnerabilities these software clients represent. Then we examine the vulnerability, threat, and potential consequences through an analysis of documents we found circulating on these networks. Focusing on the top 30 U.S. banks, we analyze a set of leaked documents collected throughout the supply chain, including suppliers, customers, and the banks themselves. We also analyze user-issued search information on these same institutions, finding an astonishing number of searches targeted to uncover sensitive documents and data. For our sample of banks, we analyze tens of thousands of relevant searches and documents. We characterize the nature of these searches and files and the underlying drivers of file leakage and movement. We find statistically significant links between leakage, firm employment base, and the number of retail accounts. We also find a link between firm visibility and threat activity. More importantly, we find that the firms experiencing greater leakage also experience increased threat. Finally, we discuss managerial implications and propose a simple benchmarking technique to compare leakages. Our analysis clearly reveals a significant information risk firms and individuals face from P2P file-sharing networks.
File Sharing in Peer-to-Peer Networks filE shAring on p2p nEtworKs enables users to publish and distribute any file from music to video to spreadsheets. Napster brought the concept of file sharing into the mainstream with its wildly popular music-sharing service. While only operating for two years before its court-ordered closure in 2001, Napster enabled tens of millions of users to share MP3-formatted song files. In its place many other file-sharing systems have emerged, driving an endless debate over the impact of music sharing [21] , and a string of legal challenges by the music and video content industry (e.g., the recording Industry Association of America and the Motion Picture Association of America). Yet none of these efforts seem to reduce file sharing. rather, the industry's legal and communication pressures have pushed users onto new clients and networks that pose new and more challenging security issues. In fact, some argue that Napster's success and failure simply spurred innovation, paving the way for many new P2P file-sharing networks such as Gnutella, FastTrack, eDonkey, and BitTorrent, with related software clients such as Limewire, Kazaa, Morpheus, eMule, and BearShare.
There have been many attempts to thwart file sharing. Firms, universities, and ISPs block or throttle traffic associated with P2P systems using approaches such as port filtering. client developers responded by using ports associated with other services (Web traffic, e-mail traffic, etc.) to exchange data, blending file-sharing traffic with other data streams. recent traffic studies suggest that P2P connections are now distributed across all ports [15] .
Today, file sharing continues to grow, with usage doubling from less than 4 million in 2003 to nearly 10 million simultaneous users in 2006 [20] . Many more files are shared in hard-to-track private networks, sometimes called dark networks (or darknets), accessed through invitations from other users. Even faster sharing growth is occurring in BitTorrent, which is one of the most popular applications for very large files such as video. Users of these systems readily adapt and change to new networks based on legal pressure, features, and popularity. For example, the FastTrack network (used by Kazaa) has seen declines over the past three years whereas others, such as the Gnutella network and the popular Limewire client, have grown. These rapid shifts suggest low barriers to entry for new sharing technologies, supported by a well-informed user base that is willing to explore new alternatives.
Inadvertent Disclosure in File Sharing
filE-shAring cliEnts typicAlly Allow usErs to share data in a particular folder and often direct users to move media files they wish to share into that folder. In normal operation, the client simply writes files to disk as it downloads them, and reads files from disk as it uploads them. There are several routes for confidential data to get on to the network: a user accidentally shares folders containing the information; a user stores music and other data in the same folder that is shared; a user downloads malware that, when executed, exposes files; or the client software has bugs that result in unintentional sharing of file directories. Of course, it is not necessary for a worm or virus to expose personal or sensitive documents because many users will unknowingly expose these documents for many reasons. For example, some users mistakenly point to My Documents and end up sharing all of their files. In some cases, the client interface design makes it difficult to see what is being shared. Moreover, P2P filesharing systems often provide incentives for users to share files via faster downloads or broader searches. The clients typically come with wizards that are designed to find all media files and share the directories where media files are located. So a single MP3 file in My Documents can lead to sharing everything in My Documents. Moreover, the clients often share all subdirectories of a shared directory.
Many of these reasons point to the interface design [7] and features of P2P clients that facilitate inadvertent sharing [28] . In our earlier research, we illustrated the problem by uncovering a wide range of private personal information, including passports, birth certificates, and tax returns. We also showed, through honeypot experiments, that there are significant threats from individuals actively seeking this information to commit theft [12] . In that paper, it was argued that, while we believe that many information leaks are the result of accidentally shared data rather than the result of malicious outsiders, there are many other trends that are driving more security concerns. They include:
• Growing usage and network heterogeneity means more leaks. With many networks and clients, users are not likely to grasp the security issues and P2P developers will likely not focus on security.
• "Set and forget" increases losses. P2P clients tend to be "set and forget" applications that run in the background while the user is not at the computer. This suggests that the user is not carefully tracking the activities of the P2P client, increasing the opportunity for abuse. Further, even benign file-sharing programs consume significant processor time and network bandwidth, conditioning the P2P user to tolerate sluggish performance that, for others, might be a first sign that a system has been compromised.
• No borders result in global losses. Geography is largely irrelevant in P2P networks, meaning no particular country or region is safer than another. A computer logging on in Bombay or Brussels becomes part of the same network as a computer in Pittsburgh.
• Malware. While the overwhelming majority of traffic on P2P networks is entertainment content (games, movies, music, etc.), also lurking on P2P networks are files that pose severe security risks [14, 23] . Viruses that exist in e-mail and other programs also have variants that exist in P2P networks [9] .
Firms often mistakenly believe that they are immune from P2P disclosure problems because they protect the perimeter of their networks with firewalls and even use software to block corporate users from accessing file-sharing networks. however, even the best perimeter systems fail when corporate users connect to the Web on public networks while traveling or at home. More importantly, sensitive corporate information is held by customers, suppliers, contractors, and other business partners, and they may be leaking documents, too. The nature of information flows within the extended enterprise significantly increases the challenge of preventing leaks.
Methodology and Data
to chArActErizE thE risKs fAcing lArgE finAnciAl institutions, their partners (suppliers, contractors), and their customers, we examined both the vulnerability and resulting consequences of leaked files and the threat posed by those searching to exploit the vulnerability. As noted earlier, we focused our analysis on the supply chains of the Forbes top 30 U.S.-based banks [3] . Those institutions collectively employ more than 1 million people, manage more than $7 trillion, and comprise a wide range of sizes as shown in Table 1 .
With the help of Tiversa Inc., which monitors global P2P file-sharing networks, we gathered and categorized P2P searches and shared files related to these institutions over a seven-week period (December 27 to February 13, 2006 ). Tiversa's servers and software allowed us to monitor and to participate in the three most popular networks (each of which supports the most popular clients), including Gnutella (e.g., Limewire, BearShare), FastTrack (e.g., Kazaa, Grokster), and eDonkey (e.g., eMule, eDonkey2000). Given the nature of P2P networks, it is difficult to make statements regarding the exact population size in aggregate or at any particular moment or our ability to observe some faction of the population at any moment. As mentioned earlier, recent estimates place the P2P population at nearly 10 million simultaneous users [20] . The networks themselves are dynamic, with members constantly joining (and sharing files) and leaving. Thus, over a period of a day, some estimate that as many as 20 million users issue upwards of 800 million searches. Using Tiversa's systems, we participated in those networks globally and collected a large sample of this activity.
To gather relevant searches and files, we developed a digital footprint for each financial institution. A digital footprint comprises terms that would quickly lead you back to the host firm or important trading partners (suppliers, contractors, vendors). These terms, if googled, would often (but not always) lead you directly back to the host firms. For example, for a firm such as hewlett-Packard they would include:
• firm names, abbreviations, nicknames, ticker symbol (e.g., hewlett-Packard, hewlett, hP, hPQ); if the organization is the merger of two or more companies, each one could be active (compaq); • key brands and subbrands (e.g., Compaq, Inkjet, and Pavilion); • subsidiaries, divisional names (e.g., HP Shopping and Home Products Division); and • suppliers, contractors, vendors (e.g., Celestica and Accenture).
Searches or files containing any one or combination of these terms were captured. Of course, increasing the number of terms included in the digital footprint increases the number of search and file matches found, but also increases false positives-searches and files captured that have nothing to do with the institution in question. In practice, we developed a footprint and then tuned it to eliminate terms that seemed less useful and added ones that were. Our goal was to cast a large initial net with 20 to 30 terms and then further refine the footprint to eliminate unrelated items, reducing the collected searches and files that must be manually analyzed.
P2P User-Issued Searches: The Threat
Using this approach, we collected over 437,800 searches issued by P2P users looking for terms that matched our digital footprints including 41,700 unique strings. Those searches were evaluated and reduced to nearly 16,000 searches with good fit for the banking institutions. The resulting searches were then manually analyzed to assess their intent. Our goal was to categorize the searches by a measure of their threat. After studying thousands of searches, we developed a four-point threat scale: high (3), medium (2), low (1), and public (0). Although a five-or seven-point scale would allow for greater discrimination, in practice, we found we could not further distinguish between the searches. Thus, we concluded that a more detailed scale would increase the scale's variance through the induction of random noise rather than a systematic variance attributable to the underlying threat phenomenon [4] . As shown in Table 2 , those categorized as high threat (i.e., 3) were searches directed for specific documents or data that could fuel malicious activity. Medium-threat searches were ones targeted generically against the firm. Such searches would uncover sensitive files along with music, video, and so on. Low-threat searches were ones searching for music, picture, or video files related to the bank's footprint. While these searches could be seen as benign, they would also uncover sensitive files and thus expose vulnerabilities that could still represent a threat to the institution and its customers. Table 3 shows examples of searches we observed in each of the three categories. Directed searches for databases, account user information, passwords, routing, and personal identification numbers represent clear threats.
Medium-threat searches, such as those for bank names, are more generic. Low-threat searches such as "bank of america tower" or "wells fargo music man" may seem innocent, but keep in mind that these are searches on P2P file-sharing networks, not Google. Each of these searches would uncover other bank-related files.
For many firms, coincidental association with a popular song or brand represents another problem we call digital wind. Millions of searches for that song increase the likelihood of exposing a sensitive bank document. Either by mistake or by curiosity, when these documents are exposed, they are sometimes downloaded to other clients, thus spreading the file and making it more likely to fall into the hands of someone who will try to exploit its information. For example, the popular song "citizen cope" creates digital wind for citizens Bank. See other examples in Table 4 .
Inadvertently Disclosed Files: The Vulnerability
During this same period, we also collected files that we observed being shared on the networks. We focused on business-related files, particularly those from Microsoft Office Suite (including file extensions doc, xls, ppt, mdb, along with rft, pdf, and txt). Using the digital footprint, file names with any related terms were captured. In some P2P networks, files are also indexed by their associated meta-data (such as the name of the firm to which a word processor is registered). Thus, we captured those documents as well. Using this approach, we collected more than 114,000 files totaling more than 15GB of data over the seven-week period. Tiversa's systems allowed us to limit the files harvested to unique Internet protocol (IP) addresses, thus reducing the number of duplicate files collected.
With the vast sample of files, we conducted a cross-sectional analysis of files for all banks found in a single week, thereby reducing the data set from all files found over all seven weeks to those found during the last week of collection. Files were manually evaluated on multiple dimensions [24] . For each file examined, we noted if the file was flagged to reduce distribution; for example, if it was marked "confidential," "restricted," "Internal Use," and so on. We recorded the file's age by examining both the file's meta-data (e.g., creation and editing dates) and dates inside the document. We also assessed the source of the leak (customers, suppliers, internal) by examining IP addresses and clues within the document. After examining the document, it was classified based on its type and on a four-point scale of its sensitivity as reflected by the potential consequence if exploited. (These methods are further described in Appendix  Tables A1 and A2 .) Like the search classification scheme, the scale included a high (3), medium (2), and low (1) along with (0) for public documents. Public documents are ones that the firm would want widely distributed (although they may be surprised to know these document are circulating in music-sharing networks). Keep in mind that while leaking a low-sensitivity document (like a 0) may seem harmless, if that document is leaked from a source with access to other more sensitive documents, it is likely a matter of time before that source leaks a more damaging document. This outcome is analogous to the safety literature [8] , which has observed that small accidents often precede much larger ones. results this sEction providEs An ovErviEw of soME of thE KEy obsErvAtions from this extensive data set of searches and disclosed files.
Searches: The Threat
A graphic summary of the 15,989 searches with good fit for the banking institutions is shown in Figure 1 .
To protect specific institutions, bank names are not included, and bank numbers shown in the figure are randomly assigned. They do not represent the Forbes ranking numbers. As might be expected, there is wide dispersion of search interest in the banks. From an initial examination of the data, we observed that the largest firms with strong global brands seemed to experience the most search activity. It is hypothesized that firm visibility is a key driver of search activity. Formally, we propose:
Hypothesis 1a (Firm Visibility Increases Threat): Firm visibility increases the threat of discovery and exploitation of inadvertent disclosures.
Of course, marketing theory would link brand strength to consumer awareness [16] . Firms 2 and 6 represent banks in this category and experienced a large number of highly threatening searches. Bank 20 represents the case of a bank experiencing significant digital wind. That bank does not have a well-known global brand, but its name and associated products have names that unfortunately share common elements with a popular music group. Many of the smaller banks experienced far less search activity, either by luck (less digital wind) or by obscurity. Yet, as can be seen in Figure 1 , many of those small institutions still experienced targeted searches. The figure clearly demonstrates the threat faced by these institutions.
To test the hypothesis that search activity is correlated with bank brand visibility, we performed a least squares regression on a linear model of searches (Y). Brand strength in marketing [16] is often measured on positive brand attributes (e.g., quality, value, trustworthiness, reliability). however, we were more interested in the notoriety of the brand, which is not limited to positive elements. So, as a simple measure of brand visibility, we chose the number of firm employees (X).
Banks with a large employment base typically have a large retail customer base (rather than business customers) and many visible branch offices that are open to the public. We note that this is simply one of many possible surrogates for visibility; others include the number of retail accounts, total assets, or the number of bank branches. We argue that number of employees is a good measure of the visibility of the bankbetter than revenues or assets, which may be driven by large business customers, who provide less public visibility for the bank. Likewise, the number of locations might not capture the impact of urban and rural markets.
Because low-threat searches (1) were driven by other phenomena unrelated to the bank, such as popularity of a song that coincidentally shared digital footprint elements, we limited searches (Y) to include medium-and high-threat searches (which accounted for 7,194 searches). Table 5 shows that the visibility of the bank explains much of the variation in P2P search activity. This parsimonious model explains nearly 80 percent of the variation of search activity between banks. A regression limiting Y to high-threat searches (3) yielded even stronger support (R 2 of 0.86 with significant coefficients at 0.01).
Inadvertently Disclosed Files: The Vulnerability
With a massive collection of documents, we conducted a cross-sectional analysis (files for all banks found in a single week). We chose to focus on the last week of collection. This week included 12,706 documents that required largely manual analysis to determine bank relevance and sensitivity. We chose this approach based on our hypothesis that documents found early in the collection process would likely include many public ones available on many clients, or ones that had been circulating for some period while ones found later would more likely represent recent leaks. Keep in mind the nature of P2P networks where some users are constantly sharing files while others periodically join the network as they (1) turn on their computers, (2) launch a P2P client to find music or other files, or (3) download a P2P client and begin sharing files as a new network member. We hypothesized that our collected documents would thus experience an initial transient phenomenon often seen in simulation analysis of complex systems [18] .
In the end, we found limited support for this hypothesis from the data. Given the vast sea of files floating in the P2P environment and the transient nature of users, the file discoveries (particularly of relevant, unique files) varied significantly from day to day. While our daily finds fluctuated based on many factors, we did not observe a noticeable drop-off in the number of files from week to week, nor did we find a statistically significant difference in document age for those found early or later in our data collection.
The last week contained 12,706 documents, many of which were not related to any of the banks in question. After hundreds of hours of manual analysis, we categorized 2,432 documents as relevant to the banks of which 1,708 were unique (30 percent were duplicates). Duplicate documents are interesting as they show the spread of certain files. Given the nature of P2P networks, duplicates increase the likelihood of threatening searches successfully finding a document. An analysis of unique document sources indicated a breakdown as shown in Figure 2 .
The source was determined by an analysis of the content of the file, its meta-data, and the disclosing IP address, categorizing them into three groups: individuals not involved in the banking operation (customers), another company working with or for the bank (suppliers), or by someone within the bank (internal). As one would expect, the majority of documents came from the most numerous demographic-customers. customer computers often double as both office and entertainment machines and many have multiple users. Therefore, users may be unaware of what someone else in the household has stored on the computer. Similarly, the documents originating from suppliers were often from smaller firms and contractors whose computers would likely be used for both home and business purposes. These were often painters, landscapers, electricians, and building contractors, and also included consultants, information technology (IT) suppliers, processors, and so on. however, we also found documents from major professional service providers such as auditors and consultants. Internal documents were about as numerous as documents coming from suppliers. Many of these seemed to come from individuals more likely to work in the field than in an office environment.
We found files of nearly every type (see Figure 3 ), but personally identifiable information (PII) documents were the most numerous, accounting for 49 percent of all unique documents. Many of these documents contained enough information to easily commit fraud or identity theft. (See Appendix Table A1 for group definitions.) The next largest category was the "other" category, which included bank addresses, charity requests, instructions, articles, fax cover sheets, and blank (public) forms. Business operations documents included employee training manuals, internal policies and procedures, and work plans. Many others originated from suppliers with regard to work that had been or would be completed for the bank (invoices, proposals, and estimates). Also numerous in this category were various internal forms (both complete and incomplete). The human resources category was also well represented with employee resumes, job descriptions, employee performance reviews, and employee lists. Along with many public and low-sensitivity documents, we found some (apparently) sensitive documents, including IT documentation, auditing evaluations conducted by third parties, and many sensitive customer documents. For one bank, we found a spreadsheet with 23,000 business accounts including their contact names and addresses, account numbers, company positions, and relationship managers at the bank. clearly, such a data trove would be very useful for a competing bank, not to mention the fraud potential. Ironically, for one bank, we found a detailed manual of their security review process.
A graphic summary of the sensitivity of the 1,708 unique, relevant documents is shown in Figure 4 . Again, to protect specific institutions, bank names are not included. The bank numbers shown in the figure are randomly assigned; they do not represent the Forbes ranking number. Like searches, there was wide dispersion of document disclosures among banks. The largest firms again seemed to have the most documents. We hypothesize that the number of leaked documents is linked to number of leak sources: In this case, it is argued that the number of employees is directed related to internal leak sources and that firms with a large employment base also have many customers and suppliers, each representing classes of leak sources. Thus, we tested the link to bank size as represented by the number of employees, using a least squares linear model of documents (Y). We ignored all public documents, limiting files (Y) to include low-, medium-, and high-sensitivity documents. This represented 1,412 files. Table 6 shows that the employment base of the bank explains much of the variation between banks in the number of sensitive files found. Again, this parsimonious model explains nearly 84 percent of the variation of document activity between banks. A regression limiting Y to medium-plus high-sensitivity files (levels 2 and 3) yielded a similar result (R 2 of 0.81 with significant coefficients). Of course, this model could be further instrumented to account for other factors such as the number of retail accounts, number of suppliers, online retail activity, digital practices of the banks, outsourcing activity, international presence, and so on.
Of these, certainly the number of retail accounts is the most interesting addition. Given the number of leaks we found flowing from customers, it is likely that the number of retail customers is a significant factor. Suppliers, on the other hand, had few leaks and are much more difficult to characterize. Given these observations, we further instrumented the model to include customers. We performed a least squares multiple regression on a linear model of searches (Y) where X 1 is the number of firm employees and X 2 is the number of retail accounts.
Each year in June, the Federal Deposit Insurance corporation (FDIc) collects and publishes data on retail accounts, which are defined so that the dollar value of deposits accounts for $100,000 or less [26] . Using that data, it can be seen in Table 7 that the overall model provides a strong fit with statistically significant coefficients. however, surprisingly, the coefficient on the number of accounts is negative. First, note that one might expect multicollinearity between employees and accounts: banks with many accounts will likely have many employees. Using an auxiliary regression [13] between accounts and employees, we detected the presence of some multicollinearity (R 2 = 0.56), but not a near-exact linear dependence. Of course, regressing just accounts against files does produce a positive and significant coefficient but with a low R 2 = 0.19. reflecting on the negative coefficient in the multiple regression, one might argue that employment base best captures the size difference between banks, but efficient banks with larger retail customer bases (or accounts per employee) do better than those with lower retail account bases. This could be driven by the nature of the banks' focus: those with a strong retail focus may be taking better steps to educate and protect customers from leakage.
The Link Between Threat and Vulnerability
With a picture of the vulnerability, we return to further examine the related threat. While bank visibility is certainly linked to the threat, there are other factors that To test this modification of hypothesis 1a, we performed a multiple regression of searches (Y) where X 1 is the number of firm employees and X 2 is the number of sensitive files found (low, medium, and high). Table 8 shows support for h1b with good model fit and statistically significant coefficients at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. Again, one might be concerned with multicollinearity between employee and files, since our earlier result showed a significant positive relationship. We note that a model with searches alone also produces strong fit (R 2 = 0.82) with a significant, positive coefficient.
conclusions and Managerial Implications inAdvErtEnt disclosurE of sEnsitivE businEss inforMAtion represents a major information risk facing firms. The popularity of many Web 2.0 applications, including collaboration tools and P2P file-sharing networks, have created many new security risks for organizations. In this paper, we illustrated the threat and vulnerability of firms to leaks in P2P networks, characterizing the extent of the problem for large financial institutions. We found that both the vulnerability and threat are well explained by institution visibility and the number of leak sources. We also found that banks leaking information experience greater search threat. Thus, reducing the leaks not only reduces the vulnerability but may also reduce the threat activity of those looking to exploit the leaks. Faced with this P2P threat and vulnerability, executives can take many actions to improve their information security. While brand strength and recognition are certainly desirable attributes, firms should consider branding in light of the digital wind created by other media. Such considerations would also be helpful in making their brands more likely to stand out in traditional Internet searches via Google or Yahoo. Firms could also introduce file-naming conventions and policies to reduce the meta-data footprint of their documents. These types of initiatives reduce the threat of documents being found and spread.
On the other hand, many other initiatives can be taken to reduce the leaks. Key among them is employee, contractor, supplier, and customer education on the dangers of P2P file sharing. One of the security challenges many organizations face is developing effective strategies to help individuals in the extended enterprise make better information risk decisions [6] . For Web applications such as file sharing, the benefits to the individual sometimes outweigh the perceived risks because users do not always bear the cost of a security failure. Technical steps to block P2P participation on firm equipment help address this issue along with policies for home machine use and supplier security qualification. Periodic P2P monitoring and benchmarking is also useful in gauging progress and comparing firm performance with peers. Based on our statistical analysis, we propose that firms measure document leaks in terms of documents per employee per unit time, holding the document search and collection effort constant. Such a measure provides a useful benchmarking tool for security executives. As shown in Figure 5 , summarizing file disclosures this way provides a very different picture of bank security performance. In our case, over the week analyzed, firms with less than 0.5 documents per 1,000 employees appear to be the leaders. Of course, document sensitivity must be likewise considered. Moreover, it is important to realize that even a single high-sensitivity document can be very damaging.
We see many of the current P2P trends further increasing the problem. In ongoing work, we are continuing to analyze the data we gathered to provide managers and developers with clues on how to best control these inadvertent disclosures. 
